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How can business reporting be improved? 
A research perspective 
Martin Walker* 
Abstract-This paper provides a Commentary on the four main papers presented at the 2006 Information for Better 
Market’s Conference. Since the purpose of the conference is to encourage policy relevant research. this commen- 
tary discusses some of the key policy issues raised by the papers, and i t  identifies areas where either further work 
is needed or where a change in the orientation of academic research may be appropriate in order to increase its pol- 
icy relevance. A particular theme of this paper is the need to think about corporate accounting and financial dis- 
closure policy issues in a realistic economic context which allows for: moral hazard (investors cannot observe 
managers’ decisions), adverse selection (managers have insider information). significant proprietary costs of dis- 
closure. and the possibility that the market has value relevant information that is not observed by managers. 
This paper provides a commentary on the four 
main papers presented at the 2006 Information for 
Better Market’s Conference. 
Two of the papers provided useful surveys of the 
academic research literature on financial disclo- 
sure. Botosan (2006) focuses on the demand side 
of the market and Lundholm (2006) on the supply 
side. Thus in this paper I start by discussing some 
of the problems that arise when putting the de- 
mand side and supply side together into a single 
model. I then attempt to provide a little more detail 
on aspects of the disclosure literature that were not 
covered by the main papers. 
Watts (2006) is a wide-ranging policy discussion 
with potentially profound implications for the way 
accounting standards are set. He believes that the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
and the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) need to adopt a broader frame of reference 
in thinking about the development of standards. 
Watts sets the development of corporate financial 
reporting in a historical context and argues that 
stewardship has traditionally been the main focus 
and purpose of corporate financial reporting. 
Current attempts to downplay the importance of 
stewardship may result in accounts that are not fit 
for purpose. 
Gray (2006) focuses on environmental issues 
and the potential role of accountants in environ- 
mental accounting and social responsibility issues. 
Gray broadly advocates a stakeholder view of the 
corporation. I draw an important distinction be- 
tween macro-governance and micro-governance 
and argue that the stakeholder view is a misguided 
j’Professor Walker is at Manchester Accounting and 
Finance Group. Manchester Business School. Crawford 
House, Oxford Road. Manchcster M I3 9PL. E-mail: niar- 
tin.walker@MBS.ac.uk 
attempt to devise a micro-governance solution to a 
macro-governance problem. 
1. Disclosure and the cost of capital 
Christine Botosan (2006) has provided an ex- 
tremely helpful state-of-the-art survey of the liter- 
ature on the cost of capital and corporate 
disclosure. She has pointed to some of the major 
theoretical and empirical issues that confront re- 
searchers in this area. In particular she has ex- 
plained why it is currently unsafe to draw any firm 
conclusions about the nature of the relationship be- 
tween disclosure and the costs of equity and/or 
debt capital. Incidentally, it seems to me that the 
number we should be really interested in, is the 
firm’s cost of capital - i.e., the WACC. 
Rather than summarising Christine’s paper, I 
thought i t  might be helpful to explain why this lit- 
erature is failing to arrive at clear-cut conclusions. 
The main point I wish to make is that one needs to 
be careful in interpreting what it is we see when 
we observe an empirical relation between two en- 
dogenous variables, i.e., disclosure and cost of 
capital. In particular I wonder just how safe it is to 
treat disclosure as an exogenous variable in the re- 
lation between disclosure and the cost of capital. 
The important point here is that the cost of capi- 
tal is a price. And like all prices it is determined by 
supply and demand. Thus it seems to me that we 
need to model the supply and demand relation be- 
tween endogenous disclosure and endogenous cost 
of capital. 
If all firms are wealth maximising then they will 
choose a disclosure level for which the marginal 
cost of additional disclosure equals the marginal 
benefit (see Figure 1). If all firms behave like this 
then what is the point of trying to estimate the re- 
lation between disclosure levels that vary between 
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96 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Figure 1 
Disclosure 
firms for equilibrium reasons? 
One possibility is that for some reason some 
firms might be choosing to ration their levels of 
disclosure. For example, if some managers want to 
hide what they are doing then they may choose to 
restrict disclosure. In this case you will get a set of 
observed points such as in Figure 2.  In this case the 
points nicely track the marginal cost line and the 
observed line would be a true estimate of the rela- 
tion between disclosure and the marginal costs of 
disclosure to shareholders. Note that in order for 
this story to hold true we need to be able to explain 
why some managers restrict disclosure below an 
optimal level, and how and why they can get away 
with doing this. What prevents the optimum level 
of disclosure from being enforced? Lundholm's 
(2006) paper to some extent addresses this issue. 
Another problem with this rationed disclosure 
story is that an alternative equilibrium story gives 
the same empirical prediction. For example, if all 
firms disclose optimally and the marginal cost of 
disclosure is constant across firms then firms with 
less steep marginal benefit (MB) lines will dis- 
close more (see Figure 3). Note that fitting a line 
through the equilibrium points here produces an 
estimate of the disclosure supply curve not the de- 
mand curve. In general, what you get depends on 
which curve has the most variation. If the cost 
curve varies across firms but not the marginal ben- 
efits curve then you will get an estimate of the 
marginal benefit curve. Such results are largely ir- 
relevant for policy makers since all firms are al- 
ready behaving optimally. 
Figures 4 and 5 show some other patterns that 
could theoretically be observed in the cross-sec- 
tion. Here each point is the intersection between 
the demand and supply curves of the individual 
firms. In Figure 4 steeper marginal cost (MC) lines 
are associated with shallower MB lines. 
In this case the will be no simple functional re- 
lation from disclosure to the benefits of disclosure. 
In Figure 5.  in which steeper MB lines are associ- 
ated with steeper MC lines, we get a negative rela- 
tion between estimates of the marginal benefit of 
disclosure and disclosure. In these two cases the fit 
of equilibrium points measures neither the demand 
nor the supply side of the market. 
In the light of this analysis it seems reasonable to 
conclude that we are a long way from being able to 
model the economic effects of corporate disclosure 
on the cost of capital, and vice versa. 
2. Motives for disclosure and non- 
disclosure 
Any attempt to model the supply side of financial 
disclosure needs to understand the motives for and 
against disclosure. Russell Lundholm's paper pro- 
vides a neat summary of the empirical literature in  
this area as well as taking us through some of the 
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Figure 2 
I Disclosure 
When some managers ration disclosure more than others, we get a 
disequilibrium story of the relation between marginal cost and disclosure 
Figure 3 
I Disclosure I 
Equilibrium relations when marginal benefits of disclosure differ 
Observationally this is the same as the rationed model 
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98 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
I Disclosure 
This is what happens in equilibriiim if steeper MC lines 
are associated with shallower MB lines. 
Figure 5 
I Disclosure I 
Disclosure equilibria when steeper MC lines are associated with 
steeper MB lines. 
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Internationnl Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 
theoretical work that helps us to think more rigor- 
ously about the determinants of disclosure choice. 
The starting point of Russell’s paper is the dis- 
closure principle. The disclosure principle is based 
on the following assumptions: 
1 .  Management knows a value-relevant bit of in- 
formation. 
2. Outside investors know that management knows 
this information. 
3. Management is motivated to maximise the value 
of current shareholders’ equity. 
4. Management can credibly disclose the informa- 
tion at zero cost. 
5 .  All outside investors interpret the disclosures/ 
non-disclosure in the same way 
(Dye, 2001). 
If the disclosure principle holds, then the only 
possible disclosure equilibrium is one in which all 
managers disclose except those with the worst pos- 
sible information, in which case investors can au- 
tomatically infer that the news must be bad. Thus 
in this equilibrium all, the ex-ante information 
available to management is fully reflected in share 
prices. 
Russell surveys a body of empirical evidence 
that is broadly consistent with the disclosure prin- 
ciple. He then examines the implications of relax- 
ing assumptions I ,  3 and 4. With regard to 
assumption I ,  (managers have nothing to disclose) 
the evidence reviewed is rather narrow. This points 
to the need for more work on identifying the spe- 
cific circumstances and types of firms where as- 
sumption 1 is more likely to be true. Papers that 
focus on all firms at all points in time inevitably 
include observations where nothing was disclosed 
because there was nothing to disclose. These are 
hardly interesting cases! 
With regard to assumption 3.  the evidence sug- 
gest that firms in which managerial wealth is less 
closely linked to shareholder value tend to exhibit 
lower levels of disclosure. This evidence is consis- 
tent with the disequilibrium disclosure rationing 
model illustrated in Figure 2. There has been much 
work documenting the relation between corporate 
governance quality and earnings quality. The re- 
sults surveyed in this section suggest that research 
on the relation between disclosure quality and cor- 
porate governance quality might also be worth- 
while. In particular, it would be interesting to 
know how the disclosure stance of the firm is de- 
cided. Is this something that is left to the discretion 
of the chief financial officer and the chief execu- 
tive, or is it something in which corporate boards 
in general - and non-executive directors in partic- 
ular - take a close interest? 
With regard to assumption 4, the evidence shows 
that commercial sensitivity issues limit the will- 
ingness of some firms to disclose. This is consis- 
99 
tent with the cross-sectional equilibrium sketched 
in Figure 6. 
There are a number of areas where I felt the sur- 
vey could be extended. 
First. Russell’s paper focuses on disclosure as a 
potential solution to the adverse selection problem, 
but it is important to bear in mind that financial re- 
porting confronts a moral hazard problem as well 
an adverse selection.’ There is a principal-agent re- 
lation between shareholders and corporate man- 
agers. To some extent this point is picked up in the 
‘Don’t care’ section of the paper. Managers may 
not be motivated to maximise share price, and so 
they may not bother to disclose. However, this sec- 
tion does not explain why any managers would 
choose not to disclose. it simply recognises that 
some managers may have a stronger motive to dis- 
close than others. In a principal-agent context, 
whether or not full  disclosure ensues depends on 
whether the conditions for the revelatiori pti/7C;pd 
hold (Lambert, 2001). Sufficient conditions for the 
revelation principle to hold are: I )  communication 
is costless and the message space is rich enough’ 
to carry the information; 2) there are no restric- 
tions on the form of the principal-agent contract, 
and in particular both sides can pre-commit not to 
renegotiate the contract at a later date; 3 )  the prin- 
cipal can pre-commit to how any information re- 
vealed by the agent will be used. It is well known 
that, if the revelation principle holds, there will be 
no demand for earnings management. Thus one 
might interpret the voluminous findings that 
demonstrate the widespread presence of earnings 
management as indicating that the revelation prin- 
ciple probably does not hold, i.e. one or more of 
the above conditions are not true. 
If the revelation principle does not hold, then we 
may end up facing a trade-off between the provi- 
sion of information for contracting purposes and 
the provision of information to deal with the ad- 
verse selection issue. For example, it may be nec- 
essary to constrain how management disclosures 
will be used in executive compensation or related 
performance contracts within the firm, in order to 
induce full disc1osure.j 
Second. the papers reviewed by Russell all as- 
sume that managers are at least as well informed 
about the determinants of firm value as the market. 
I frankly doubt that this is an entirely accurate as- 
’ A moral hazard problem arises when the agent’s action 
choice is not observed by the principal. An adverse selection 
problem arises when the agent has information about the state 
of the world that is not observed by the principal. 
For an example of a message space that is not sufficiently 
rich, suppose the agent observes that the true state is high, 
medium. or low, but can only send one of two messages (not 
high. or high). 
’ If managers believe that their disclosures will be used to 
assess their performance than they may have an incentive to 
provide either misleading or incomplete information. 
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100 ACCOUNTING A N D  BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Figure 6 
Disclosure 
This is what happens if some firms have higher costs of 
disclosure than others 
sumption. Watts (2006) points to the fact share 
prices aggregate the views of potentially thou- 
sands of investors, some of whom may have in- 
sights about the value of the firm that are not 
known by managers." Thus while it seems entirely 
reasonable to assume that company managers have 
information that the market does not have, it seems 
less reasonable to assume that managers know 
everything that the market knows. Perhaps one 
reason why managers do not disclose is because 
they don't actually know how the market will re- 
spond to the disclosure. 
In addition to exploring the implications of the 
possibility that the market is better informed than 
the managers, more work is also needed on mod- 
els in which the market responds inappropriately 
to corporate disclosures. Many corporate financial 
managers argue that it may be unsafe to disclose 
certain information because they will not be un- 
derstood by the market. In part this may reflect ig- 
norance by financial managers of how the market 
works. It does not matter if the average investor 
has limited decision-making ability so long as the 
marginal investor is really smart. If the average in- 
vestor is dumb then the marginal investors (hedge 
funds) will soon move in to correct any mis-pric- 
ing. However, to the extent to which there are lim- 
its to the arbitrage opportunities available to smart 
investors (e.g. short sales restrictions) the possibil- 
ity arises that the market may respond incorrectly). 
In particular if short sales restrictions are the main 
limit on arbitrage then the most likely form of mis- 
pricing will be an excessive overreaction to good 
news. Some preliminary theoretical work on mis- 
pricing and firm disclosure can be found in 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003).' 
Third, a general concern I have with the eco- 
nomics of disclosure literature is that it does not 
seem to mesh very well with the financial report- 
ing process. Related to this is the tendency of this 
literature to focus on simple one-shot games. More 
attention needs to be paid to the possibility that in 
repeated games firms have a powerful incentive to 
build a reputation for frank and truthful disclosure. 
All of this needs to be placed in a context in which 
the earnings process is paramount, and where un- 
audited voluntary disclosures are largely con- 
cerned with explaining why the current accounting 
numbers are what they are, and how future ac- 
counting numbers are expected to benefit from 
current managerial decisions. 
' For example, some investors may have a better feel for the 
way macro-economic developments will affect the firm. 
Others may have a better understanding of how technological 
developments elsewhere may affect the firm. 
Short-selling is particularly risky if any mis-pricing takes 
a long time to correct itself. 
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International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 
3. What has the invisible hand achieved? 
It  is always a pleasure to listen to Ross Watt’s 
views on accounting policy. Ross has consistently 
challenged conventional views about accounting 
standard-setting and has raised fundamental issues 
about the context and purpose of the standard set- 
ters’ task as well as their political motivation. 
3.1. Coiltext 
Watts (2006) views financial accounting as one 
of the cogs in a complex machine. The function of 
this machine is to facilitate the operation of the fi- 
nancial system. especially that part of the financial 
system that provides and regulates corporate fi- 
nance. Within this financial system a complex net- 
work of arrangements need to be made for 
corporate governance and corporate financial 
communication. Accounting standards are just one 
small part of the machine, and it is therefore vital- 
ly important for there to be a good fit between this 
part of the machine and the other parts of the ma- 
chine. Attempts to set accounting standards that 
fail to reflect the broader context in which they op- 
erate are likely to produce sub-optimal standards 
i.e. standards that are not fit for purpose. 
Another important aspect of context, that Watts 
(2006) highlights, is the role of the legal system, 
and in particular the litigation rights of sharehold- 
ers and other suppliers of capital. In general ac- 
counting practice needs to accommodate and 
respond to litigation risks. Again, there needs to be 
a fit between accounting standards and the legal 
context. 
One wonders, for example, how this will play 
out in  the context of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs) in the European 
Union where common standards are being im- 
posed across a diverse set of legal and corporate 
governance systems. 
3.2. Purpose 
In recent months the FASB, in association with 
the IASB, have been asking some searching ques- 
tions about the primary purpose of financial state- 
ments. For example, FASB have recently hinted 
that they believe the concept of stewardship is sec- 
ondary to the provision of information for deci- 
sion-making purposes. 
‘Stewardship and accountability. The Board 
agreed that stewardship or accountability should 
not be a separate objective of financial reporting 
by business entities in the converged franie- 
work.’ (FASB, 2005) 
This contrasts sharply with the historical record 
Watts (2006) recalls in his paper: ‘The original de- 
velopment of accounting and financial reporting 
appears to be driven by agency costs’ (Watts, 2006). 
The FASB statement ignores the fact that in gen- 
101 
era1 there are two kinds of information asymmetry 
involved in managing the relations between insid- 
er managers and external suppliers of capital. First, 
there is an adverse selection problem. Managers 
have access to information about the value of the 
firm that is not available to investors. Companies 
need to devise mechanisms to signal to potential 
and current investors that managers will not ex- 
ploit their information advantage to the detriment 
of external parties. Second, there is a moral hazard 
problem. Managers observe their own action 
choices, but external investors do not. Moreover, 
managers observe the information they had at the 
time they made their decision and external in- 
vestors do not. An important role of external fi- 
nancial reporting is to control the agency costh 
arising from the moral hazard problem. It is unfor- 
tunate that the terms of discourse of FASB and 
IASB fail to pick up on this fundamental point. 
Terms like relevance, reliability, materiality, and 
understandability do not map neatly onto the agency 
theory framework. At some point these convention- 
al frames of reference will need to change to reflect 
modem understandings of agency costs. 
As evidence for the agency point of view, Watts 
(2006) points to the demand for conservatism with- 
in financial reporting. The demand for conservatism 
only makes sense in a model of the financial report- 
ing that recognises that insiders have an information 
advantage over external parties. Accounting stan- 
dard-setters need to change their conceptual frame- 
works to explicitly allow for such conflicts of 
interest. Conflicts of interest are a key driver of the 
demand for financial reporting and so they should 
be an explicit feature of the standard-setting logic, 
not an after thought or a second order issue. 
In developing the role and purpose of financial 
accounting Watts (2006) points to the comparative 
advantage of accounting over other forms of fi- 
nancial communication. He notes: 
‘[Tlhat the evidence suggests accounting’s com- 
parative advantage in supplying information to 
capital markets is something other than produc- 
ing a broad range of information or an estimate 
of firm value. It is to produce “hard” verifiable 
numbers that discipline other sources of infor- 
mation.’ 
In particular, Watts (2006) points to the impor- 
tant ex-post verification role of accounting. Hard 
accounting numbers can be more easily related to 
forecasts made in the past either by insider man- 
agers or investment analysts. Within a financial 
communication system in which there is a rich 
“Agency costs include the costs of contracting. monitoring, 
providing incentive payments. bonding costs. and the residual 
loss of value that occurs when managers make sub-optimal 
choices. 
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I02 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
flow of forward looking information outside the fi- 
nancial reports themselves, there is a need for an 
objective historical record of financial perform- 
ance that can be related back to prior expectations 
and promises. 
In our ongoing research for the Institute of 
Charted Accountant in England and Wales 
(ICAEW) I interviewed a senior manager from a 
major investment house. I asked the subject for 
their views about performance reporting in gener- 
al and Headline Earnings in particular: 
Answer: ‘Well, this is where you have the whole 
issue of what is the purpose of earnings. In my 
mind there are two earnings numbers essentially. 
Maybe more than two. One is this year’s earn- 
ings as a predictor of next year’s and clearly re- 
moving a one off item that’s not going to recur 
will give you a number for this year that is a bet- 
ter predictor of next year’s earnings. Then there 
is “earnings” as a measure of company perform- 
ance this year and a one-off loss on a contract or 
something may not be a good predictor of next 
year’s earnings, but it certainly tells you the 
management’s performance this year. So as a 
measure of Performance I have quite a lot of 
sympathy with the headline earnings type of ap- 
proach. From a predictive value point of view, 
yes you could argue that identifying other items 
as one off would be useful. But, then there’s one 
off and there’s one off, and then you get a prob- 
lem of companies showing restructuring charges 
every year as one off. So [X PLC]’ for example 
shows restructuring charges every years for the 
last five years ... So I think the forecasting of 
earnings should be left to analysts. The company 
should not say here is our earnings number 
cleaned up which is pre-exceptional etc because 
you could even !o a stage further and you could 
normalise margins! But where do you stop in 
ternis of this normalising approach‘! I think earn- 
ings should be a historical record of what you 
have achieved, and then it should be left to the 
market to decide what you will achieve next 
year. So you need to provide enough information 
about your historical results to enable that to 
take place, including for example details about 
your restructuring program. Disclose what you 
have spent on restructuring in the last few years. 
disclose information that will enable you to how 
much of that was non-recurring. So in that sense 
I am really in the headline earnings camp rather 
than the normalised earnings camp.’ 
Interviewer: ’You make an interesting distinc- 
tion between performance measurements on the 
one hand and predictions of the future on the 
other. Do you feel that has always been an area 
of conflict in financial reporting, that there is this 
culty about what financial statements are 
for? Should they primarily be a performance 
statement and other information as a basis of 
predicting future performance, or should they 
primarily be a statement for predicting the future 
and that seems to be a tension that has been 
going on for a long time?’ 
Answer: ‘Well, I think they should be both. The 
trouble is that people seem to think that in order 
for them to be useful in predicting the future the 
summary bottom line numbers need to be 
changed in some way. Whereas, I think to pre- 
dict the future, you just need to provide good 
useful relevant information which is why I sup- 
port the new performance reporting statement. I 
think it helps in providing that information. 
Many people go on about value reporting and 
how we should be reporting about the value of 
the business. I mean, the ICAEW brought out a 
report about value reporting and it’s emphasising 
the future cash tlows of the company and almost 
advocating that you should be reporting on a net 
present value basis, the change in the net present 
value of the future cash represents your earnings 
- all that sort of thing. Well, that’s fine, but 
who’s working out what these future cash flows 
are, who’s working out the normalised level of 
profitability‘? It can’t be the company because 
they’re the prople whose perjormunce i s  Iwi i ig  
/netrsured. So, what you should be doing is pro- 
viding objective information about what has 
happened with additional disclosures to enable 
users to work out their own forecasts.’ 
The lessons for policy makers are clear. From a 
value relevance point of view investors focus on 
forward looking estimates of sustainable earnings. 
Investors are looking to firms to produce measures 
of performance to date, and objective information 
to assist investors in producing their own estimates 
of sustainable earnings. 
A major unsettled issue for accounting standard- 
setters is the role of earnings within the financial 
reporting process. Standard-setters need to under- 
stand that earnings play a vital dual role in linking 
the past to the present. and the present to the future. 
Looking backwards, investors should be able to 
trace the link between past investments (including 
investments in intangibles) and current payoffs. 
i .e. earnings. The replacement of historic cost ac- 
counting with fair value balance sheets would re- 
duce the ability of investors to trace these links.x 
’ Nnme of company dihguised. 
There may be good reiisoiis for wpplying investors with 
plied iis a suppleiiieiitary disclosure rather changing thiiii the 
main historic coat accotiiita. Another alternative. that might 
help preserve the l inh hetwrci i  invcstmcnt history iiiid ctirreiit 
cai-ning\. wotild he historic cost account\ ;I\ suppleinentary 
disclowres ;uid fail- v;iIuc iiccotints as  the main xcnt i i i ts .  
f.’. ‘iii value accounting inforination. However. this could be S L I ~  
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Looking forward, investors need to be able to re- 
late current investments and other historic, current, 
and planned actions by managers to future earn- 
ings. Eventually all worthwhile investments, in- 
cluding investments in intangibles such as R & D. 
must affect future earnings. Claims that earnings 
are no longer relevant in the context of a knowl- 
edge-based economy fail to understand this basic 
truth. Even if one accepts that the relation between 
investment in intangibles and future earnings is 
more difficult to predict than conventional invest- 
ments, this does not alter the fact that investors 
need to be able to estimate and understand this re- 
lation in order forecast future earnings. 
I03 
be) economically desirable. and what is politically 
feasible. Suppose that in spite of the significant 
differences in culture, legal arrangements. tax 
rules, and national cultures, it is generally accept- 
ed that a single set of global accounting standards 
are economically desirable. Does it inevitably fol- 
low that all individual nation states will agree to 
accept the standards mandated by an all-powerful 
IASB? What forces would exist for individual 
states to opt out of this equilibrium? Assuming that 
global standards are accepted then what forces 
would exist for standards of audit, enforcement, 
and disclosure. to vary across nation states etc? 
In the new world order, when China becomes the 
largest economy in the world round about the mid- 
dle of this century, it is doubtful if anyone outside 
the US will accept the proposition that internation- 
al accounting standards should be determined by 
the needs of US investors and US preparers. It is 
entirely possible that both the EU and China will 
develop corporate governance and corporate fi- 
nancing systems that differ significantly from the 
arrangements currently operating in the US. It is 
even possible that the US will decide to reform its 
own systems as events unfold and as more is 
learned about the limitations of its current corpo- 
rate governance arrangements. International ac- 
counting standards need to be flexible enough to 
accommodate a variety of corporate governance 
practices, legal systems, and national cultures. The 
assumption that a single CAP GAAP will be fit all 
regimes needs to be tested to destruction. 
3.3. Equilibrium accounting policies 
Watts (2006) argues that the setting of account- 
ing standards is a political process, and that as well 
as analysing the economics of accounting stan- 
dards one must also pay attention to the political 
forces that shape them. This point is very impor- 
tant. Many years ago I studied the possibility of 
Pigovian taxes for the regulation of pollution. A 
number of economists proved that an efficient out- 
come could in principle be achieved through 
Pigovian taxes. However it is never enough to 
show what is economically desirable. One must 
also understand what is politically feasible, and 
Pigovian taxes contain a fatal flaw, because they 
assume that the proceeds of such taxes can be dis- 
tributed without anyone realising where they came 
from. Once people realise that they can reduce 
their other taxes by voting for more Pigovian 
taxes, the pollution controller loses control of the 
level of the tax. 
At the present time, the FASB and the IASB are 
choosing to place greater emphasis on the value 
relevance of the balance sheet over the general 
stewardship role of financial reports, and hypo- 
theticar current asset values over historic cost. 
FASB fundamentalists like to refer to this ap- 
proach as CAP GAAP. 
Watts (2006) argues that CAP GAAP is actually 
inconsistent with what the market wants (Cap Gap 
perhaps‘?), and that such changes will be political- 
ly unpopular. I f  Watts (20.06) is correct then the 
FASB cannot assume that anything it does will be 
a political equilibrium. Political and economic 
forces will combine either to replace or restructure 
FASB or to initiate other forms of financial report- 
ing to correct the deficiencies of CAP GAAP. 
More generally, there is an issue about the possi- 
bility and desirability of global accounting stan- 
dards. Watts (2006) points to the general 
unwillingness of US politicians to concede any in- 
tluence over what happens in America to interna- 
tional regulatory bodies. One only has to look at 
Kyoto to appreciate this. Here we see another ex- 
ample of LI clash between what is (or at least may 
4. Does sustainability reporting improve 
corporate behaviour? 
Turning to Rob Gray’s paper, I first wish to thank 
Rob for agreeing to present his ideas at a confer- 
ence designed to encourage debate between the 
various ideological groupings that exist in ac- 
counting. Academics on the right and the left of 
the sub-ject tend to meet at separate conferences, 
publish in different journals. and generally try to 
pretend that the other side does not exist. I believe 
that this failure to engage in debate is unsustain- 
able. 
Rob points to the enormous gap that exists be- 
tween what he calls real sustainability and the 
perverted representations of the notion of sustain- 
ability that appear in so called corporate social re- 
sponsibility and environmental disclosure reports. 
1 think he makes some telling points which indi- 
cate that so much that appears as social responsi- 
bility disclosure comes across as just hollow 
rhetoric apparently designed to delude its readers 
into believing that they are ‘doing the right thing’. 
1 am tempted to conclude from Rob’s analysis 
that companies should be discouraged from mak- 
ing any such disclosures. and that they should 
foc u s on con vent i o nal performance re port i ng . 
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though I suspect that perhaps this was not the in- 
tention of Rob’s negative appraisal of the state of 
the art in this area. 
Towards the end of his paper Rob takes a side- 
swipe at the notion of shareholder value. 
‘The evidence as I read it - and as I have been 
reading it for 30 years - is that the only way in 
which we can continue to pursue shareholder 
value is if we continue to destroy the planet or if 
we redefine shareholder value to include some- 
thing other than the making of even more money 
for people who already have too much. A share- 
holder value that embraced compassion, respect, 
trust, life, air, water, safety, nature, beauty sun- 
shine etc. might be quite a nice idea?’ 
While I am inclined to agree with Rob that the 
planet faces potential environmental catastrophe, I 
am afraid I profoundly disagree with him about the 
desirability of redefining the meaning of share- 
holder value. 
I see the issue of sustainability as a macro gov- 
ernance issue to be managed by macro policies and 
regulations. On the other hand I view shareholder 
value maximisation as a core organising principle 
of micro governance. It is vitally important to 
draw a clear distinction between the micro gover- 
nance of the corporation (through delivering 
shareholder value) and macro governance. Macro 
governance is concerned about the governance of 
the relations between business in general and soci- 
ety as a whole. In particular it is concerned with 
the governance of the relations between society 
(represented by political and regulatory bodies) 
and large and powerful ‘mega’ corporations. 
Any complete approach to management of the 
economy and society needs excellent micro gov- 
ernance and excellent macro governance. The 
problem comes if you fail to distinguish carefully 
between these two forms of corporate governance, 
and especially if you try to solve a macro gover- 
nance problem by meddling with the arrange- 
ments for micro governance. I view stakeholder 
theory as a misguided attempt to apply a micro 
governance solution to a macro governance prob- 
lem. Thus I view the stakeholder approach to 
corporate governance as well meaning, but com- 
pletely misguided. 
Let us take, for example, the issue of pollution 
permit trading. I t  is almost certainly the case that 
the planet has a limited capacity to assimilate car- 
bon dioxide emissions. If the total annual emis- 
sions of carbon dioxide exceed this limit then 
global temperatures will continue to rise and 
many people will die. It seems to me that the ob- 
vious economic solution to this problem is to es- 
tablish a global market in tradable carbon dioxide 
emission permits. with the number of permits set 
well below the estimated maximum sustainable 
amount. 
This solution is not only sustainable environ- 
mentally, it is also deliverable through normal 
micro-governance mechanisms. Let us consider 
the advantages of this approach. First, the market 
will automatically ensure that the permits are allo- 
cated to the polluters who can generate the most 
value from their licences. Second, the owners of 
the permits will have an incentive to ensure that no 
other parties exceed their permitted limits. Third. 
polluters will have a powerful incentive to invent 
technologies that cause less pollution. Finally, 
there will be a publicly observable price per permit 
that provides an objective measure of the marginal 
cost of achieving the target emission level (at pres- 
ent we have to rely on the private estimates of pol- 
luters, who can hardly be relied upon to tell the 
truth). This looks to me like a win-win outcome, as 
Rob calls it. 
Some might object to this policy because it 
might lead to a situation where the rich nations buy 
up all the rights for themselves. However this ob- 
jection can be circumvented by auctioning off the 
permits through a global agency such as the UN or 
the World Bank. The proceeds of the auction could 
then be used to ameliorate world poverty. I would 
call this a win-win-win outcome! 
What is it that prevents this obviously attractive 
economic solution from being introduced’? I 
would argue that i t  principally is the Energy 
Lobby (and perhaps also airlines and other energy 
intensive companies) in the US that has captured 
the White House and a majority of US legislature. 
The problem does not stem from shareholder 
value maximisation as an economic organising 
principle. What it stems from is the excessive PO- 
liticnl power of the mega-corporate sector. This is 
a crisis of macro governance, not micro gover- 
nance. 
The crucial macro governance question we need 
to consider is, how can individual citizens protect 
themselves from the political power of the mega- 
corporation? In particular, how can a free society 
place strict limits on the political power and regu- 
latory influence of the giant energy, defence, 
chemical, biological, transport (e.g. airlines), soft- 
ware, and media corporations? 
We should remind ourselves that the private sec- 
tor corporation was introduced purely as a conven- 
ient legal device for the financing and organisation 
of economic activity. It  was never the intention of 
the inventors of the corporation that it should be- 
come a political entity, let alone an entity that 
threatens the foundations of a democratic society, 
and even the very survival of the planet. 
Furthermore, the fact that corporations have been 
granted the enormous privilege of legal personali- 
ty should not imply that such legal entities have 
the same rights to freedom as individual flesh and 
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blood human beings. 
How can accounting help in constraining the 
political power of corporations? Well, perhaps a 
useful starting point would be to require all cor- 
porations to maintain an auditable record of any 
communications (direct or indirect) between any 
of its owners or employees with any politicians or 
political/regulatory bodies. In accounting for a 
corporation we are required to maintain adequate 
records of all its business transactions. Perhaps 
we should now recognise that, an addition to 
business transactions, corporations have politi- 
caUregulatory 'transactions', and that these also 
should be recorded and appropriately sum- 
marised. 
If the leaders of such organisations complain 
about this proposal they should simply be in- 
formed that this is part of the price of limited lia- 
bility for their own corporations and freedom for 
all. 
105 
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